Technics, Technology and the Para-Human by Barker, Stephen
 
 
Technics, Technology and the Para-Human  
 
My brief avenue of inquiry here will be to consider the explorations of sociologico-
philosophy laid out by Gilbert Simondon, relative to technology “itself,” in the 1950’s and 
60’s, which had a seminal influence on a wide variety of central thinkers emerging since, 
from taken up and advanced today by Bernard Stiegler, the Director of Research at the 
Pompidou Center, and his Ars Industrialis. Stiegler’s sense of technics as an answer to 
both Dasein and Derrida, let alone to global mediatization and psychoanalysis, may offer 
a clue as to one fruitful avenue to follow. Stiegler asks us to think after: after Husserlian 
and Heideggerian (and Derridean) phenomenology (there are still important traces of 
phenomenology in Derrida, though not as many as detractors—who dislike, fear, or 
haven’t read deconstruction, claim)—and not only phenomenology but the many overt and 
covert remainders of Romanticism that frame the human narrative today.  
 
There is no such thing as the « atom » of a subject; its center is ceaselessly 
in motion. . . . We are a multiplicity. (WP 175) 
 
               —Nietzsche 
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I recently had an operation, and for the entire four hours I was the only person—the only 
human—in the room. No, I hadn’t found some way to operate on myself: after some other 
humans strapped me to the operating table, they all left. It was just me and the very large 
yellow robot. At the push of a button in another room, the table pivoted ninety degrees, 
leaving me head down and feet to the ceiling. The surgeon, who was also in another room 
(in the same hospital, but who could have been in New York or Helsinki or on his 
sailboat), put on the gloves and began to move the robot’s “appendages” toward me. I 
wasn’t aware of it, of course (and in that sense there were no homo sapiens in the room—
none at all), but at the end of the day I found myself with five puncture wounds, and not 
quite sure what to say to thank the surgeon for the fine job he had apparently done. Should 
I have thanked the robot as well?—it (he? she?) did the work, after all. Didn’t . . . it? 
 
My particular operation happened to take something out, but what if it had involved 
putting something in? A lung? A pacemaker? A heart? And what if in five or ten years I 
need, say, a new arm or leg? Instead of tacking someone else’s on, I’ll just be injected 
with the appropriate stem cells and grow my own arm, my own leg. And what might that 
then mean: “my own arm”? How is “my arm” my own?—“my own” (think how 
problematic and slippery those two words begin to appear!). Potentially, I’ll be able—as 
soon as Mr. Bush is gone and (presuming there’s still intelligent life in the universe) sanity 
returns to global public policy—to grow any new piece of me that I may need. 
Pacemakers adieu! An arm, a leg, a heart, more hair, pectoral muscles . . . how about a 
brain?—why not?: it’s just a muscle as well. 
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And let’s say that will happen (and it surely will—there’s profit to be made). What, then, 
becomes of “me,” moi-même propre, my proper self?  Obviously that isn’t just this thing, 
this body (including that thing inside my skull); but does it matter what “it” is, that “my 
proper self”? On the one hand, this has always been the question of philosophical thought; 
on the other, it has astonishing new meanings today, in ways we may only beginning to 
discover. 
 
I’ll suggest here that this very question—all of this robotics, like the technics of stem-cell 
research, only opens the door to such questions by a crack, and that the philosophy 
concerning itself with nominalism, or pragmatics, or analytics, is as blindly out of 
currency as Heidegger’s Dasein. Much more stunning possibilities—and of course not just 
in medicine—have been conceived and are daily being conceived. Some concern what 
used to be called “natural philosophy,” some deal with causality, some with the nature of 
the mind and reason. All involve the nature and shifting senses of materiality, and all of 
these innovations and suggestions,  and the ability to work through them, are the basis of 
what both certain kinds of science—and certainly philosophy as structured (that is, 
technical) inquiry—will be in the 21st century. 
 
A couple of seeming digressions, through Baudrillard, Deleuze, and Derrida, and several 
others, circling in on Bernard Stiegler’s work on technics: 
 
For Baudrillard, whose thoughts on technics are, I think, under-examined, the most 
  4 
extreme perspective on the materiality of medium is found in his idea of recipocity, his 
characterization of a medium as a system administered by a code interwoven reciprocally 
within 1) a technical apparatus (sound, image, etc.) and 2) a corporeal one (gesture, 
sexuality, etc.). " Reciprocity comes into being," says Baudrillard, "through the 
destruction of mediums as such.” Composed of the seemingly "immaterial" code, yet still 
to be "destroyed," a medium is fully charged with its materiality. The direct implication of 
Baudrillard’s destructive reciprocity is that the re- or de-orientation of the material 
(Stiegler’s focus in Volume 2 of Technics and Time, subtitled Disorientation—appearing 
from Stanford in October . . . )  anyway, this disorientation does not lead to the immaterial 
but branches off into the immaterial and its material "sites" or "supports.” Instead of 
materiality in the forms of both substantial objects and their meanings, we find—and this 
is the core of Stiegler’s case—metastatic information overload, but also, perhaps 
ironically, a new obduracy, in terms of materiality one might say a hardness, of 
"supporting" materials ranging from hardware and appliances to software and 
programming systems, a new kind of "performativity" for things as such, for bodies, and 
for materiality qua materiality. 
 
What is at stake is not a search for any “reality of the material” nor the “materiality of any 
real,” of course, but rather, for Stiegler, the forces, vectors, and underlying constraints 
whose material, technological, and procedural potentials have been overlooked, 
misunderstood, or dismissed by interpretational conventions. This is why Stiegler is 
working backwards in Technics and Time, from his critique of Heidegger in Volume 1, to 
Husserl (and more Heidegger) in Volume 2, to Kant in Volume 3—with a pause in the 
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unfinished Volume 4 to consider psychoanalysis, and then to Plato—to the core of the 
problem with materiality and technics—in the concluding volume, number 5. 
 
So, while for Baudrillard the task of philosophy is to transmit something that does not and 
will not allow itself to be codified” (that is, subject to control by the State), for Stiegler 
that is “merely” a pseudo-philosophical task. Stiegler claims that such codes and controls 
are precisely that by which the “human,” and all of its myriad materialities, emerges—
from but remaining embedded within technics.  
 
Gilles Deleuze, on another hand, is a different kind of materialist—but also a vitalist and 
an empiricist; his two central figures, Spinoza and Nietzsche, force us to look at the 
materiality of thought, which must not be constrained by our consciousness of it. 
Philosophyies of transmission, of forces to bodies, as pure exteriority. 
 
For Deleuze as for Badiou, philosophy will create what Deleuze calls “lines of flight” 
from the static traps (pièges; philosophy’s traditional abstractions, such as universality, 
unity, subject, object, multiplicity) to new transmissions. Instead of universals, processes 
of universalization; instead of unity, the process of unification, etc. 
 
The creation of these intensities, as openings or re-openings, these “lines” in the sense of 
vectors, is Deleuze’s event; unlike for Badiou, then, for Deleuze philosophy, properly 
understood, is the process of creating events, as transformations subsisting both before and 
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“over,” so to speak, the spatio-temporal world, but still materializable, expressible in 
language. For Deleuze the event does not have a proper “moment,” is not a happening but 
rather the potential immanent in a particular confluence or constitution of forces. 
Deleuze’s event does not disrupt a continuous state; the state itself consists of underlying 
or potential events which, in their actualization, mark every moment of the state as a 
transformation; that is, event is unrelated to any materiality, has no position, structure, 
temporality (not even duration), nor property—and no beginning nor end. Yet things 
consist of the events constituting their potential for transformation; event is the 
momentary uniqueness of a congregation of forces, a wholly immanent production, not the 
image of some model nor the representation of some more fundamental reality; event has 
no goals, is pure effect: no outcomes, only potentialities. 
 
Since concepts are, according to Deleuze, singularities, philosophy’s task is to constitute 
assemblages of these singularities, the process of constituting multiplicities. Philosophy, 
then, is not contemplation or reflection, certainly not teleological pseudo-interrogation, 
and not even the meta-ontology whose task is to consider the relations between 
ontological systems and structures, but rather a construction site, occurring on the plane of 
immanence (since such a process can only take place immanently). 
 
And since thought (all thought) is process (that is, technical), it is ineluctably implicated 
with the “unthought” in thought: since philosophy is the event of creating new lines of 
flight for thought through transmission, materiality and immateriality too are dynamically 
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linked and integrated. Immaterial concepts return to materiality through functionality, 
which though immaterial “exists” or “takes place” only in materiality. 
 
Philosophy’s processual materiality is reduced or destroyed only when the immaterial is 
linked to the transcendent, a philosophical dead-end where dynamic interactions, 
transferences, and deterritorializations cannot take place. 
 
Through his conception of the machinic (in his book on Foucault, for instance), Deleuze 
speculates on new possibilities for human forms, for a para-human created out of what he 
calls the “event-forces” of carbon and silicon, abstract machines whose materiality is 
what he calls the “vital principle” of the “plane of consistency,” where eventful 
conjunctions—machines—take place. As for Stiegler’s technics, for Deleuze this is not 
cybernetics, in which the machinic is informational language, but rather analogic 
language, that is, the image, which acts directly on the nervous system independently of 
the “framing brain,” the apocryphal “brain behind the brain.” For Deleuze (this out of 
Bergson), materiality is already image (what Deleuze calls “luminous”). This brings 
Deleuze very close to Stiegler’s notion of the human “default,” the human as aporia, 
created out of a prior technics: the human as an industrial temporal object, as para-human. 
Deleuze mirrors Stiegler’s prioritization: brains will not develop computers which will 
develop a language common to both computer and brain; rather, that computers are 
extending and will create new, unforeseeable genres of and for thought, that computer and 
brain will collaborate in creating—eventfully—an abstract machine. 
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But I wouldn’t want to go too far with Stiegler’s proximity to Deleuze: Stiegler finds 
Deleuze to be a predictable “classicist” in opposing “exactitude” and “authenticity,” for 
example, blind to the Stiegler’s implications of the abstract machine for technics. 
 
The link to Stiegler’s philosophy occurs, in Deleuze, in the relationship between 
temporality and image. In Cinema 2, Deleuze explores the “time-image” in a way that 
reminds us of Stiegler’s use of the image as a function of mnemotechnics in his treatment 
of Fellini’s Intervista, starting in Technics and Time 2 and continuing in Volume 3. The 
increasing concretization of the cinematic, virtual, or numeric image’s chimerical 
materiality deepens with the radical shifts in retentional finitude (the threshold/limit or 
capacity of human memory) now taking place; perhaps the most para-human implication 
of Stiegler’s technics is the crisis (for, for example, performativity and constativity) that 
emerges with the generalized performativity resulting from the becoming-temporal-object 
of everything, of every event when retentional finitude is industrially rationalized (Stiegler 
1996: 233). Though it is Derrida who first defines “retentional finitude” in his 
interrogation of Husserl’s “retention,” (Stiegler did his doctoral work under Derrida) it is 
Stiegler, beyond Derrida, who shows that any quarantining of so-called present perception 
not only from recollection but from industrialization—since all of these occur within 
technics—is chimerical. 
 
The Derridean notion of technics first appears in “Plato’s Pharmacy,” explicitly 
introduced behind the transcendental logic of the Meno; rather than inscription’s reflecting 
  9 
truth, its possibility is constitutive of truth as such. This archē-writing, as technics, i.e. as 
the condition of possibility of immaterial objects (what Stiegler calls objets temporelles), 
and thus of the notion of objects, is the “constitutive nature of technics,” an “originary 
technicity” as supplement to the “nature of all living systems” (Derrida, 1972, 240). Jean-
Luc Nancy makes a similar point but goes further: his “a-reality” comes, as he says, 
“before and after the subject”: “World is liable [i.e. linkable] to sense; it is this liability 
because it first comes to be in accordance with this . . . distancing.” Nancy calls this a 
“quantum philosophy of materiality” which, he says, “remains to be thought.”  
 
I agree with Nancy, as though I think he has more closely approached this thought than 
did Derrida (in general because of methodological differences), my suggestion is that 
Nancy’s “quantum philosophy of materiality,” like Derrida’s technics, though it still 
remains (and will always remain) to be thought, as technologies and mnemotechnologies 
pervade “public space” and time, as industrial objects of production/consumption, i.e. as 
materiality is brought increasingly into the questions McLuhan, Debord, Simondon, and 
others asked of it in its first generation, is much closer to being thought in Stiegler’s work.  
What Stiegler does with the notion of disorientation in Volume 2 of Technics and Time is 
to show how technics inflicts violence upon phusis; how technics is no longer a modality 
of disclosure in accordance with the growing of being as phusis. It is this "in accordance 
with" which shows that technology is setting itself contra beings, against any totality of 
existents. Because technics-as-technology has transformed to the point at which it 
disregards or is no longer open to the possibility of beings to grow or bring itself forth, to 
upsurge, technics-as-technology dominates their possibilities, absents them from their 
own ability to disclose, or, in short, discloses them for them. This taking over of the 
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bringing forth of being, this vicarious or prosthetic control is what constitutes the future, 
the para-human.  
 
We are no longer in Baudrillard’s code-crisis: for Stiegler, technology is materiality-as-
objectification-in-inscription (of the trace), of the coded, encoded, and recoded (though, in 
Baudrillard’s sense, never de-coded); now, technics is a materiality of codes, of 
mnemotechnics. 
 
Stiegler derives many of his theoretical codes from Derrida, but it is the sociologist and 
philosopher Gilbert Simondon who supplies Stiegler with his highly-ironized notion of 
“individuation,” a radical re-conception of the technology/subjectivity relation. For 
Stiegler out of Simondon, the “individual subject” is an effect of technics occurring on a 
“pre-individual plane” (Deleuze also derives his version of this from Simondon, as he 
repeatedly acknowledges), conceived as the support and constitution of ipseity, as 
condition (support) and technical process (constitution). This sense of the pre-individual 
could easily link to Nietzsche’s Apollinian/Dionysian tension, in which the Apollinian 
principium individuationis is confronted with an-individual intoxication in Dionysus, the 
principle of the para-human); Stiegler’s expression for this is “nous avant je.”  
 
As it is for Deleuze, this abyssal and ubiquitous movement of energy, which Simondon 
calls “transduction,” is a condition of flux in which materiality as a function of space and 
time is governed by transmission and mnemotechnologies.  
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While technics has been thought (by a humanism embedded in phenomenology) as “the 
low limit of the human,” the fact is, as Stiegler convincingly shows, any sense of 
“culture,” from which all notions of “the human” emanate, has already been determined 
by technics. This occurs because as technics evolves, certain human phenomena 
constitutive of a culture modify themselves more slowly and less radically: juridical 
institutions, language, fashion, religious rites. These more slowly-changing aspects of 
culture (associated with the human as opposed to the technical)—recognized as “slow-
moving” because of the  reciprocal causality of transduction, acknowledge an increasing 
distance from technē.  
 
Thus the nature of the human, indeed ontology itself, shifts from Aristotelian 
hylomorphism to materiality’s potentialities and virtualities, as form and as support. Ens 
is revealed as a set or field of virtual reals developable as externally independent of any 
biological (or zoological) individuation. 
 
Simondon’s revolutionary gesture is in seeing that the technical object is not an “artificial 
being”: . . . pluri-functional, existing not as an organ or a body but as a milieu, as a 
support for technē and for other structurations (technologies); i.e. that the “technical 
object” is super-saturated, fulfilling a function not only within the “plane” or “field” but of 
the field as such: every technical materiality must be conceived of as a perpetual 
redundancy of information to be understood as subject to the law of the conservation of 
technics: no technics can be lost since technics, as McLuhan says, is.  
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The concealed/revealed detonation in Deleuze’s claim has to do with the notion of 
technics as singularity; this seeming oxymoron is the crux of the matter: how can technics 
“be” a “singularity,” an “exception,” if indeed it is the sign of the field itself? 
 
Stiegler insists that the grammar of any technics, any language, cannot place itself in 
advance of any universal, regulatory “law” other than a law of exception constituted 
during the shifting performance of technics itself. Technics is radically neutral, as 
humanity is in the myth of Epimetheus on which Stiegler bases his investigation of 
technics, value-free and meaning-free in the most fundamental sense (in the realm of the 
support, the medium: the message is that the message is the medium).  
 
Technics in advance of technologies, as the potential and the virtuality of every 
technology, and this technological potential encompasses all embedded and all closed 
systems. Thus the idea of the  “experience” of technics which, because it is always prior, 
consists of an anticipation, is a troubled dialogue between what Brian Massumi (in 
Parables for the Virtual) calls the “modulate” and the “mediate.” For Stiegler, these are 
extensions of the two prostheses from which the a-phenomenological world is constituted, 
“body” and “world.”  The nature of technics radically alters the very notion of the 
“message”: there is no “sender,” no “receiver,” no “message”; there is only “modulation,” 
“resonance” between “body” and “world,” always anticipating the next phase, step, or 
plane of technological development.  
 
One of the vital effects of this dissemination is the fundamental problematization of what 
could be called the “localizable” in both so-called “experience” and “the human.” If 
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Stiegler’s “retentional finitude,” as mnemotechics (“the human” as reflexivity) is in fact 
constituted by technē, then in fact, as Jean-Luc Nancy says, 
 
 
Our world is the world of technics, the world of which cosmos, nature, gods, 
the entire system in its intimate jointure is exposed as ‘technics’: what it does 
is our bodies, which it creates. 
 
 
For Nancy as for Derrida, this supplementarity of technical prosthetics spaces out, defers, 
expropriates all originary properness. As Stiegler says, 
 
 
The “becoming temporal object of everything” in the epoch of informatic 
calculation amounts, however, to a major technological transformation that in 
fact challenges the continued existence of the human, technocultural potential 
for individual and collective individuation by undermining precisely its 
capacity for epochal redoubling (Stiegler 1996: 219). 
 
 
In the current era of numerical calculative systems, the digital age, integrating various 
technical systems via the simulational propensity of the computer system challenges and 
disorients the invention and consistency of the temporal world. 
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“The becoming-temporal object of everything,” according to Stiegler, 
 
 
which is produced by the media and, beyond them, by the omnipotence of the 
new programmatology “rhythming” [music and especially rhythm are vital to 
Stiegler’s ideas] and weaving space-time-light, is also the primordial 
phenomenon that arrives with informatic calculation. The different analogical 
and numerical identities systematically temporalize everything retained (as 
selected) in a new configuration of instances that are constitutive of all event-
making. Synthetic cognition is constituted as the algorithmic sequentialisation 
of an unfolding of instructions or operations by which the regulatory loops 
determine recurrent moments as feedback…. It is evident that the structure of 
every object emerging from a network of neuronal automatisms is 
(intra)temporal in that all changes of state of the network (as changes of the 
ensemble) come to be crammed together on top of the “now” determined by 
the tickings of a clock (Stiegler 1996: 219). 
 
 
Stiegler alerts us that it is the nature of industrial temporal objects of the current epoch 
(which as of last night was still the digital/numerical era, though that may have changed 
by now) to permutate at such a rate (what Stiegler calls “light-time” rather than “light-
speed”) that they increasingly overload and “short-circuit” any sense, let alone 
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“experience,” of events—of eventness. The prostheses of mnemotechnics arise as pre-
selected, processed, and recalled (that is already past) via what we still call “realtime” or, 
even more ironically, “live,” informational networks, producing increasing disorientation 
in a memory-system bereft of even the potential to individuate through the process of 
selective secondary retention (so-called “normal” memory) in what Stiegler calls the “bath 
of local rhythms” (Stiegler 1996: 277). The crucial distinction, for any sense of “the 
personal,” between primary retention (lived experience) and tertiary retention (essential 
factical prostheses of experience) slides further and further toward becoming “formal and 
void” (1996: 277). 
 
Stiegler’s case is that this slippage, the uncoupling of the dynamic of individual and 
collective individuation, is a threat to the human itself. Individual perspectives lose 
confidence in the horizon of collective becoming (“protention”) stored in the reservoir of 
tertiary retentions we call heritage, cultural tradition, and orientation. The prosthetic 
collectivity of cultural experience and heritage, tertiary retention, simultaneously 
disconnects from any possible singularity of experience. Thus the immediate 
transformation of the event into a processed and re-presented “already-there” for the 
spectator/viewer, blocking through disorientation the individuation of experiences. 
 
Stiegler calls for a less prescriptive, preemptive, destructive encounter with the mediatized 
and industrialized event, in which the undermining of distinctions such as 
performative/constative and fictional/real would not need to take the form of ubiquitous 
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informatic calculation and mnemotechnics as the sole foundation of a discredited cultural 
edifice. In fact, the numerical-digital technologies by which phenomena are rendered 
programmable in the logics and schedules of the programming industries occludes the 
path by which they emerged as orienting forces. Stiegler’s exploration is an attempt to 
diagnose strategies for a re-orientation with industrial temporal objects and their 
materialities, as a way toward restoring the potential force of events and eventfulness.  
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